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Privileged groups are one of the most reliable paths to domain compromise. Members inherit rights that were designed for legitimate administration but translate directly into attacker capabilities.

Finding Group Memberships

Check group membership before anything else: knowing what groups a compromised account is in tells you what you can do next without touching a single exploit.

Domain Admins

The highest privilege group in the domain. Members have full control over all domain resources, can log into any machine, perform DCSync, and modify any object. Offensive value: full domain compromise. If you land here, dump NTDS, forge Golden Tickets, and do whatever you want.

Enterprise Admins

Only exists in the forest root domain. Members have admin rights across all domains in the forest, making this more powerful than Domain Admins in multi-domain environments. Offensive value: forest-wide compromise. Required for the ExtraSids attack (child to parent domain escalation).

Schema Admins

Can modify the AD schema, which is the blueprint defining all AD object types and attributes. Rarely populated in practice. Offensive value: low day-to-day value, but schema modifications are persistent and hard to detect. Can add new attributes or backdoor the schema.

Account Operators

Can create, modify, and delete most user and group accounts in the domain. Cannot modify Domain Admins or other privileged groups, but can log into domain controllers interactively. Offensive value: create a new user and add them to groups you control. Can also reset passwords of non-privileged users.

Server Operators

Can log into domain controllers interactively, start and stop services, perform backups and restores on DCs, and manage disk configuration. Offensive value: direct DC access without being DA. Can start and stop services on the DC; abuse a writable service binPath to get SYSTEM on the DC.

Backup Operators

Members can bypass NTFS permissions to read and write any file on the system, including files locked by the OS. Can log into DCs locally and perform backup and restore operations. Offensive value: can copy SAM, SYSTEM, and NTDS.dit directly from a DC without being DA. One of the most reliable privesc paths when you land an account in this group.
Can manage printers and printer drivers on DCs, and log into DCs interactively. Loading printer drivers requires SeLoadDriverPrivilege. Offensive value: SeLoadDriverPrivilege can be abused to load a malicious kernel driver and escalate to SYSTEM. Classic Capcom.sys / EopLoadDriver exploit path.

Remote Desktop Users

Members can connect to machines via RDP. No elevated privileges on the machine itself, just the ability to initiate an RDP session. Offensive value: lateral movement when WinRM and SMB are blocked but RDP (3389) is open.

Remote Management Users

Members can connect via WinRM (PowerShell Remoting), port 5985/5986. Added in Windows 2012. Offensive value: evil-winrm access without being a local admin. Common foothold for lateral movement once you have credentials.

DnsAdmins

Members can manage the DNS service on domain controllers and load a DLL into the DNS service process, which runs as SYSTEM. Offensive value: one of the most underrated privesc paths. Load a malicious DLL into dns.exe to get a SYSTEM shell on the DC without ever touching DA.

Protected Users

A security group that enforces strict Kerberos protections on members: no NTLM auth, no Kerberos delegation, no cached credentials, tickets expire after 4 hours. From an attacker’s perspective this is a blocker. If your target is in Protected Users, PtH fails, delegation attacks fail, and credentials won’t be in LSASS memory after logoff. Check before wasting time on those paths.

Group Policy Creator Owners

Members can create Group Policy Objects in the domain. Creating a GPO alone is not dangerous, but if the GPO can be linked to an OU containing machines or users, it becomes a reliable privesc path. Offensive value: create a malicious GPO (add local admin, deploy a startup script, drop a reverse shell) and link it to a target OU. Requires separate link permissions on the OU.

NOACCESS (Custom Deny Groups)

NOACCESS is not a built-in Windows group: it is a custom security group that organisations create to explicitly deny access to resources. Explicit DENY ACEs always override ALLOW ACEs in Windows, so membership in this group blocks the account from whatever the group is scoped against, regardless of other permissions the account holds. You will encounter these in BloodHound as a MemberOf edge from a service account or user to a group named something like NOACCESS, NO_RDP, DENY_SMB, or similar. The name usually hints at what is being blocked. Offensive value: if the account you compromised is in a NOACCESS group, it explains why your access is being denied despite valid credentials. If you have write rights on the group object, you can remove the account from it to restore access.

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